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Biodiversity preservation is often viewed in utilitarian terms that render non-
human species as ecosystem services or natural resources. The economic capture
approach may be inadequate in addressing biodiversity loss because extinction of
some species could conceivably come to pass without jeopardizing the survival of
the humans. People might be materially sustained by a technological biora made
to yield services and products required for human life. The failure to address
biodiversity loss calls for an exploration of alternative paradigms. It is proposed
that the failure to address biodiversity loss stems from the fact that ecocentric
value holders are politically marginalized and underrepresented in the most
powerful strata of society. While anthropocentric concerns with environment and
private expressions of biophilia are acceptable in the wider society, the more
pronounced publicly expressed deep ecology position is discouraged. ‘‘Radical
environmentalists’’ are among the least understood of all contemporary
opposition movements, not only in tactical terms, but also ethically. The article
argues in favor of the inclusion of deep ecology perspective as an alternative to
the current anthropocentric paradigm.
Keywords: anthropocentrism; biodiversity; deep green ecology; ecocentrism;
environmental ethics; environmental values; radical environmentalism;
representation
Formost people, the idea of harming humans to liberate animals or prevent timber sales is
unconscionable and misanthropic. The average person wonders how activists can justify
threatening children in order to save guinea pigs. Aren’t the medical and health needs of
humans, for example,more important than the suﬀering of a rodent?Animal liberationists
respond thatmost people are hopelessly blinded by speciesism and that animal suﬀering to
beneﬁt humans is morally wrong. Environmental ‘‘monkeywrenchers’’ adopt an equally
radical stance; after all, what good are natural resource extraction, private property, and
proﬁt making if the Earth itself is destroyed by mankind?
Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements (Liddick
2006:82).
1. Introduction
Based on a large number of international opinion polls, it appears that concern for
the environment is on the rise and may be universal (Dunlap and York 2008).
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Exactly 40 years ago, the Club of Rome predicted in a study titled The Limits to
Growth that population growth, industrialization and resource depletion would
ultimately inhibit the global economy’s ability to expand and in rapid loss of
biodiversity (Meadows et al. 1972).
Despite the announcement by the United Nations Decade on Biodiversity 2011–
2020, the current loss of species is estimated by experts to be between 1000 and
10,000 times higher than the natural extinction rate (WWF 2012).
The failure of the current framework to explicitly address the needs (and the very
survival of) non-human species calls for an exploration of alternative paradigms
(Kopnina 2012b). This article aims to examine what alternative approach to
representation of biodiversity is possible and what type of advocacy may be needed
in order to adequately address the loss of biodiversity. Who are the human
advocates, ‘‘who speak for nature?’’ (O’Neill 2006). Those committed to the struggle
of ‘‘radical environmentalism’’ or animal liberation are among the least understood
of all contemporary opposition movements, not only in tactical terms, but also
ethically and philosophically (Best and Nocella 2004; Churchill 2004). This article
will therefore reﬂect upon the question of what are the present-day causes for this
lack of understanding (in science and society) as well as on possibility to reduce this
lack of understanding.
2. Representations of biodiversity
In the current paradigm, two approaches can be distinguished in regard to
biodiversity and representation. One is an ‘‘economic capture’’ approach, which
advocates the extension of the existing economic methods to include ethical concerns
(Spash 2009). The other one is a ‘‘moral expert’’ approach which conﬁnes economic
methods to the analysis of welfare gains, and assumes committees of ethical experts
will complement economic expertise (O’Neil and Spash 2000). We shall examine each
of these approaches in turn. We shall discuss environmental ethics and environ-
mental psychology in order to address alternative approaches in regard to
biodiversity.
2.1. Economic value of biodiversity
Rather than addressing the limits to growth, the new rhetoric of sustainable
development (Brundland Report 1987) recast limits to growth debate as an
opportunity to balance social, economic, and environmental needs. The secretary
general of the United Nations (UN), Ban Ki-moon, said, ‘‘We need to chart a
new, more sustainable course for the future, one that strengthens equality and
economic growth while protecting our planet’’ (UN News Center 2012). Rio þ 20
UN Conference on Sustainable Development held in June 2012, promotes
(1) Human sustainability: maintaining human capital such as health.
(2) Social sustainability (organizations and networks) and maintaining social
capital: cultural, language, shared rules, laws, etc.
(3) Economic (ﬁnancial) sustainability: keeping capital intact
(4) Natural (environmental) sustainability: Protecting natural capitals (e.g.
water, land, air, minerals, etc.)
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This framing of ‘‘environment’’, ‘‘nature’’, ‘‘wilderness’’, or ‘‘biodiversity’’ as a
common good puts a price on ‘‘ecosystem services’’ or ‘‘natural capital’’ eighties (e.g.
De Groot 2002). The World Bank’s mission statement on sustainable development
frames biodiversity as an economic asset:
The World Bank’s mission is to alleviate poverty and support sustainable development.
Biological resources provide the raw materials for livelihoods, sustenance, medicines,
trade, tourism, and industry. Genetic diversity provides the basis for new breeding
programs, improved crops, enhanced agricultural production, and food security.
Forests, grasslands, freshwater, and marine and other natural ecosystems provide a
range of services, often not recognized in national economic accounts but vital to
human welfare (The World Bank 2012)
The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), a major international
initiative hosted by the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) with
ﬁnancial support from the European Commission draws attention to the global
economic beneﬁts of biodiversity, warns that our neglect of the natural services
provided by biodiversity is an economic catastrophe of an order of magnitude
greater than the global economic crisis:
The irreversible loss of natural diverse genetic resources impoverishes the world and
undermines our ability to develop new crops and medicines, resist pests and diseases,
and maintain the host of natural products on which humans rely (http://www.teeb-
web.net/).
2.2. Limits of economic capture approach
However, there is a debate about exactly how much biodiversity needs to be
preserved. Is a human-centered utilitarian perspective suﬃcient to protect all
biodiversity? While Isbell et al. (2011) argue that plant biodiversity needs to be
preserved in order to beneﬁt complex human systems, others argue that preservation
of ‘‘some’’ biodiversity would be suﬃcient to satisfy human needs. In provocative
publication Plastic Panda, Haring (2011) argues that only some select species are
needed for human survival and welfare, and that most of these species are
domesticated and ‘‘adopted’’ for human needs rather than ‘‘wild’’. In fact,
monocultures such as genetically manipulated crops or cattle will satisfy most of
human needs (Haring 2011). Biodiversity protection is not necessarily contingent
with social and economic interests, such as deriving medicines from wild plants (Crist
2003).The limits-to-growth or sustainable development framework may be
inadequate in addressing biodiversity loss because
Mass extinction could conceivably come to pass without jeopardizing the survival of the
human species; and because people might be materially sustained by a technologically
biora made to yield services and products required for human life (Crist 2003:65).
Recently, some authors have argued that market-based valuation techniques are
inadequate as they do not seem to capture the expanse, nuances, and intricacies of
many of the ecosystem services as well as ecological identity and emotional
attachments to nature the value of which is not readily understood by the economists
(Kumar and Kumar 2008). Critics have noted that green GDP requires measurement
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of the beneﬁts arising from public goods provided by nature for which there are no
market indicators of value (Boyd 2007).
In the words of David Quammen (1998):
If the world’s air is clean for humans to breathe but supports no birds or butterﬂies, if
the world’s waters are pure for humans to drink but contain no ﬁsh or crustaceans or
diatoms, have we solved our environmental problems? Well, I suppose so, at least as
environmentalism is commonly construed. That clumsy, confused, and presumptuous
formulation ‘‘the environment’’ implies viewing air, water, soil, forests, rivers, swamps,
deserts, and oceans as merely a milieu within which something important is set: human
life, human history. But what’s at issue in fact is not an environment; it’s a living
world . . .
It is thus questionable whether purely economic approach to biodiversity
conservation is adequate to address the loss of all species. Similar point can be
made about diﬀerent types of animals – those kept for consumption (farm animals),
medical experimentation and companionship (pets) or entertainment (zoos, circuses)
and those ‘‘left over’’. To take a historical perspective on human–animal relation-
ships, Shepard (1993) made a clear distinction between wild animals and those that
we use as companions or as food:
From this metonymic stew of animal as friend and object emerges the paradox that
primal peoples kept their distance from animals – except from their in-taking as food or
prototypes – and could therefore love them as sacred beings and respect them as other
‘‘peoples’’ while we, with the animals in our laps and our mechanized slaughterhouses,
are less sure of who they are and therefore who we are (Shepard 1993:289).
An alternative approach might thus be needed.
3. Environmental ethics: Anthropocentria/ecocentric continuum
Environmental problems are associated with ethics through a number of issues, such
as justice in the distribution of natural resources (such as timber) and burdens (such
as pollution), fairness in the processes of environmental decision-making, and the
moral claims of future generations of humans (O’Neill and Spash 2000). The
sustainable development discourse is permeated by the ‘‘global ethic’’ of caring for
the poor and reducing inequality (United Nations 2012; World Bank 2012).
However, this global rhetoric rarely includes environmental ethics.
Early inspirations for environmental ethics writers were English poet William
Wordsworth, and American transcendentalist writers, Henry David Thoreau and
Ralph F. Waldo Emerson, and later an American ecologist and environmentalist
Aldo Leopold. Environmental ethics posed a challenge to traditional anthropocentr-
ism by questioning the assumed superiority of human beings to members of other
species and by investigating the possibility of rational arguments for assigning
intrinsic value to the natural environment and its non-human contents (Brennan and
Lo 2002). Anthropocentric and ecocentric values can be placed on a continuum
varying from weak to strong anthropocentrism, as ‘‘deep’’ or ‘‘shallow’’ ecology
(Naess 2001).
Anthropocentric thinkers treat modern societies as ‘‘exempt’’ from ecological
constraints and to share belief in human (technical) ingenuity and ability to solve
environmental or social problems (Catton and Dunlap 1978; Dunlap and Catton
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1979, 1983; Kopnina, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). In anthropocentric thought, humans are
largely in control of the surrounding world and that problems arising from modern
living can be taken care of through technological development (Lundmarck 2007).
Ecocentric theorists postulate that the current ecological crisis stems from the
‘‘arrogance of humanism’’ (Ehrenfeld 1978).
Sustainable development advocates often subscribe to ‘‘shallow ecology’’ which
encompasses concerns that connect human health, wealth and environment, the
central objective of which is welfare of people in the developed countries (Kopnina
2012a,b). In anthropocentric view, animal rights are subservient to human rights and
can be thought about at best when human rights are fully addressed, or at worst a
non-issue (Finsen and Finsen 1994; Desmond 2013). Our acts toward animals are
judged on the basis of how they aﬀect human beings only and not on how they aﬀect
other species (Guither 1998; Nibert 2002). While sexism and racism are easily
acknowledged in the contemporary Western liberal society, specieism is treated as a
non-issue (Watson 1993; Best and Nocella 2011).
By contrast, deep green ecology is concerned about the intrinsic value of
‘‘nature’’ or ‘‘environment’’ with or without humans and rights that are associated
with this value (Devall and Sessions 1985; Regan 2001). While in anthropocentric
thought, concerns center around individuals or groups within one species (men and
women, diﬀerent ethnic groups, individuals with sexual orientations) and rights can
be attributed on the basis of group characteristics or possessions (the rich and the
poor). Discriminating human minorities or creating wealth inequality is seen as
morally ‘‘bad’’ by current Western neo-liberal intellectuals, such the author’s
academic colleagues.
Within deep ecology, there is an ethical debate as to what degree intrinsic value
should be attributed to individuals within the species (Regan 1984), entire species
(Taylor 1991; Ferry 1995) or even entire ecosystems (Singer 1975; Regan 2003;
DesJardins 2005). Ecocentric thinkers argue that if moral considerations underlying
present-day social issues such as racism, sexism, and wealth inequality are to be
extended to other species, the contrast in ethical values and anthropocentric bias is
quite striking.
While the utilitarian attitude to nature seems almost common-sense, as human
survival and economic growth are dependent on energy and material resources that
are extracted from natural ecosystems (Rees 1992), the non-anthropocentric
perspective is more diﬃcult to explain. Many scholars of environmental ethics
have agreed that an environmental ethic should explicitly consider the consistency of
our environmental actions with our values (Seligman 1989).
4. Environmental psychology
Environmental psychology provides a number of theories explaining individual
predisposition to environmental behavior. Hungerford and Volk (1990) distinguish
between ‘‘entry-level variables’’ predisposing people to take an interest in the
environment; ‘‘ownership variables’’ such as a personal investment in certain
environmental issues, and ‘‘empowerment variables’’ including skill in using environ-
mental action strategies and the belief that one can be successful. Environmental
psychology and sociology studies are anchored in research on values, beliefs, and
attitudes as well as studies addressing actual observed and self-reported behavior
(Weigel and Weigel 1978). However, while most people in modern industrial societies
agree there is a moral need to conserve nature and yet ‘‘burgeoning lists of threatened
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species and ongoing habitat destruction show that these so-called values are failing to
motivate suﬃcient political and social pressure for conservation reform’’ (Booth
2009:54).
Many theories try to explain the widespread rhetoric-behaviors gap, ranging from
insuﬃcient individual motivation for environmental protection (e.g. Hartig et al.
2007) and political constraints such as the inﬂuence on government decision-making
of corporate and industrial lobbies (e.g. Crossley and Watson 2003).
There are many studies and measurements translating of beliefs, values and
attitudes into environmentally signiﬁcant behavior published in the journals of
Environment and Behavior, Journal of Environmental Psychology, Journal of
Environmental Ethics, Environmental Education Research, etc. over the past decades.
However, these publications only partially explain why certain individuals, who, for
example, grew up in the same village next to the forest and witnessed its destruction,
will agree to work for the logging company, while others growing up in the same
village will defend the trees from being felled (Fisher 2002). Similarly, why would
some individuals express concern about the loss of biodiversity while others from the
same socio-economic class would view the loss of non-human life as a non-issue?
At least three value bases for environmental concern can be distinguished: self-
interest, humanistic altruism, and biospheric altruism (Dietz et al. 2005). The ﬁrst
two value objects can be described as anthropocentric, the last one is ecocentric
(Schultz 2001). For both self-interest or altruistic humanists, human beings are seen
as generally more worthy than members of other species (Devall and Sessions 1985;
Drengson and Inoue 1995). While anthropocentric perspective assigns only
instrumental values to other species, biospheric altruism is an extension of concern
beyond the human boundary (Ame´rigo et al. 2007) and acknowledges intrinsic value
of non-human species (Dietz et al. 2005:344).
Developmental studies of people’s environmental behaviors and attitudes shed
some light upon this altruistic predisposition to nature. The value–belief–norm
theory indicates that people assigning intrinsic value to environment outside humans
or perceiving environmental value in utilitarian terms serve as entry-level variables
(Schwartz 1977; Stern et al. 1993, 1998, 1999). The retrospective research on the
‘‘signiﬁcant life experiences’’ explain diﬀerences in environmental attitudes by
distinct experiences of the natural world acquired in early childhood (for example,
see Korhonen and Lappalainen 2004; Louv 2005). The hypothesis that the early
childhood encounters with nature are crucial for development of positive
environmental values is supported by retrospective reports of environmentalists,
which are replete with stories of early and memorable encounters with pristine
nature, such as free play, hiking, camping, ﬁshing and berry picking (Kahn and
Kellert 2002). Other formative experiences constitute experiences in organizations
like the scouts or student environmental groups (Dawson 2007), witnessing the
destruction or pollution of a valued place, and reading books about nature and the
environment (Chawla and Cushing 2007:440).
5. Biophilia hypothesis
Edward O. Wilson proposed the idea that natural selection has resulted in an
adaptive love of life-forms and life-like processes in humans. The term ‘‘biophilia’’,
meaning ‘‘love for life’’ (Wilson 1984) refers to the existence of a fundamental,
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genetically-based human need and propensity to aﬃliate with other living organisms.
According to this hypothesis, humans have an innate connection to the natural
world, and our continued divorce from it has led to the loss of not only ‘‘a vast
intellectual legacy born of intimacy’’ with nature but also our very sanity (Kellert
and Wilson 1995). The term is used by many social and natural scientists within an
interdisciplinary framework for investigating the human aﬃliation with nature. A
review of the biophilia literature (e. g. Kahn 1997) sets into motion three overarching
concerns. One concern focuses on the genetic basis of biophilia (e.g. Levy 2003). A
second concern focuses on how to understand seemingly negative aﬃliations with
nature within the biophilic framework. A third focuses on the quality of supporting
evidence and whether the biophilia hypothesis can be disconﬁrmed (e.g. Joye and
van den Berg 2011). The critics question the faith shown in the evolutionary
explanation for human relationships to other species and the assumptions
surrounding biophilia. Empirical cases testifying to the short-termism, anthro-
pocentrism, systems control and narrow species preferences present in public and
political arenas (e.g. Ojala and Lidskog 2011) suggest that biophilia might not be
that strongly wired into human psyche.
5.1. The Lorax complex
It is these three interdependent dimensions – one emotional (the feeling of sadness
when something valued gets destroyed); another one cognitive (the judgment that
it is wrong to destroy this valued object); and the third one philosophical
(intrinsic value of nature) that provide the basis of biocentric or ecocentric deep
green ecology perspective we shall hereby refer to as ‘‘The Lorax complex’’.1
Some researchers of environmental movement also refer to religious (Taylor 2010)
positions that encompass emotion and compassion expressed toward other species
(Munro 2001).
6. The radicalization of environmental movement
Radical environmentalism and animal rights extremism might have emerged from
societal and political rejection (Merchant 1992; Masters 2004; Zimmerman 1994;
Liddick et al. 2010). Disaﬀected environmentalists and animal rights advocates often
drawn from the same pool of concerned individuals that comprises the memberships
of groups such as Greenpeace, the Wilderness Society, and People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals (PETA) who have turned from political lobbying and lawful
protest to direct action (Zimmerman et al. 2001; Wolfe 2003; Sunstein and
Nassbaum 2004). As traditional methods for bringing about change fail, or do not
bring change quickly enough, disaﬀected activists break oﬀ and form a new group or
movement that advocates more extreme methods (Liddick 2006:1).
Eco-terrorism is deﬁned by the FBI’s Domestic Terrorism Section as ‘‘the use or
threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against innocent victims or property
by an environmentally-oriented, subnational group for environmental-political
reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic nature’’ (US
Department of Justice 1993). Radical environmental groups engaged in ecotage – or
economic sabotage of inanimate objects thought to be complicit in environmental
destruction – have been identiﬁed as the leading domestic terrorist threat in the post-
9/11 ‘‘war on terror’’ (Vanderheiden 2004).
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Liddick traces progressive radicalization of organizations within the environ-
mental rights movement: The Wilderness Society – Greenpeace – Sea Shepherd
Conservation Society – Earth First! – Earth Liberation Front (ELF). Since radical
biocentrists blame industrialization for destroying their most valued substance, the
earth, many do not hesitate to ‘‘alleviate’’ this problem through destructive actions
against perpetuators and their property (Arnold 1997). The progressively
immoderate methodology adopted by animal rights and environmental activists,
beginning with legal protest and lobbying, advances to civil disobedience, and
graduating to major acts of property destruction (Liddick 2006:78–79). The act of
destruction is seen as morally justiﬁed as ‘‘When we destroy something created by
Humans we call it vandalism, but when we destroy something created by Nature, we
call it progress’’ (Begley 2009:1).
For ecocentric activists, the rights of non-human species has the same moral
imperative as the earlier social movements to liberate slaves, women, homosexuals
and other ‘‘minorities’’ from dominant hegemonies.
Members of the animal liberation and radical environmental movements are motivated
by a belief that what they do is absolutely necessary and just. The exploitation of
animals is no diﬀerent from the abuse and extermination of Jews during the Holocaust,
and crimes committed to end the abuse and to free animal ‘‘slaves’’ are every bit as
noble as the actions taken by those abolitionists who ran the Underground Railroad in
the American South. Activists see attacks on governments and corporations that deﬁle
nature as just actions in defense of the Earth itself; indeed, without radical actions,
including crimes, they are convinced that much of life on the planet will cease to exist.
The sincerity and depth of feeling among animal rights and environmental extremists
should not be doubted, and it is exempliﬁed by ALF [Animal Liberation Front] activists
who risk legal penalties and see value in freeing the smallest animal, be it a guinea pig,
mouse, or snail (Liddick 2006:82).
According to Taylor (2008), radical environmentalists are characterized by their
diagnoses and prescriptions regarding the environmental crisis.
Their diagnoses generally involve a critique of the dominant streams of occidental
religion and philosophy, which, radical environmentalist argue, desacralize nature and
thereby promote its destruction. In addition to aggressive and passionate resistance to
such destruction, prescriptions generally include ‘‘reconnecting’’ with and ‘‘resacraliz-
ing’’ nature, as well as overturning the anthropocentric and dualistic beliefs they believe
alienate people from nature and produce an ideology of human superiority that
precludes feelings of kinship with other life forms. The most decisive perception
animating radical environmentalism, however, is that the earth and all life is sacred and
worthy of passionate defense (Taylor 2008:28).
At the emotional level, the outrage felt by deep ecology supporters is well-expressed
by Dave Foreman, a cofounder of the radical environmental movement Earth First!,
who uses the following metaphor to justify criminal actions in defense of the
environment:
If you come home and ﬁnd a bunch of Hell’s Angels raping your wife, your old mother,
and eleven-year-old daughter, you don’t sit down and talk balance with them or suggest
compromise. You get your twelve gauge shotgun and blow them to hell. . . There are
people out there trying to save their mother [Mother Earth] from rape (Foreman
1982:4).’’
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While some radical environmentalists may perceive humans as a threat to the
planet (‘‘Screaming Wolf’’ 1991), others integrate them as part of the planet as
ecocentrism actually very much views humans as part of the ecosphere (Rosebaugh
2004). For example, Paul Watson the founder of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society
strongly prohibits harming any living thing. In his statement on Ecocentrism
homepage, Watson states:
I am pro-life: Meaning that I am anti-war and I respect the need for every child, cub,
pup, kitten, hatchling and lamb to have the right to be brought into a world that is clean
where they can be raised with love, nurturing, nourishment, and education (http://
www.ecospherics.net/pages/wonw.htm).
While there may be no oﬃcial leaders in environmental movements, in the realm of
animal rights and environmental radicalism there are nevertheless authors, public
ﬁgures, and press oﬃcers who provide inspiration and ideological support (Liddick
2006:70). Ingrid Newkirk, Peter Singer, Steven Best, Edward Abbey, Paul Watson,
Craig Rosebraugh, Leslie James Pickering, and Dave Foreman provided inspiration
for the environmental movement. Some environmentalists represented ‘‘martyrs’’ of
the movement, such as Barry Horne and William C. Rodgers, both of whom died
while incarcerated for animal liberation crimes. Rodgers, an American environ-
mental activist, left a suicide note in his prison cell on 21 December 2005:
To my friends and supporters to help them make sense of all these events that have
happened so quickly: Certain human cultures have been waging war against the Earth
for millennia. I chose to ﬁght on the side of bears, mountain lions, skunks, bats,
saguaros, cliﬀ rose and all things wild. I am just the most recent casualty in that war.
But tonight I have made a jail break – I am returning home, to the Earth, to the place of
my origins (Quoted in Wikipedia, Radical environmentalists).
Active environmentalism espousing deep green values seems unacceptable to
the mainstream society inﬂuenced by (and some would argue inﬂuencing)
industrial neo-liberal politicians and corporate lobbies (Switzer 2003; Scarce
2004, 2005; Scruton 2012). As Rik Scarce (2011a) reﬂected in his commentary on
the documentary If A Tree Falls: A Story of The Earth Liberation Front (http://
www.imdb.com/title/tt1787725/):
When I describe my research on radical environmentalists to new acquaintances,
inevitably they say, ‘‘Oh, you mean you write about the eco-terrorists.’’ There is no
greater stigma in our society than that of ‘‘terrorist.’’ No one listens to terrorists. Their
arguments fall on deaf ears. They are imprisoned, and Daniel McGowan is, under
extreme conditions reminiscent of the terrorism suspects at Guantanamo. So the ELF’s
penchant for destruction – never mind that no human life has ever been lost as a result
of their actions – allows it to be painted as a terrorist group.
While studies of anthropocentric and ecocentric attitudes have indicated that
people with ecocentric orientation are much more likely to actually act upon their
values in order to protect the environment than those with anthropocentric
orientations (Thompson and Barton 1994; Kortenkamp and Moore 2001). Studies
indicate that only biospheric altruism-centered approach leads to sacriﬁce rather
than quality-of-life solutions to environmental problems (Kaplan 2000). Yet, the
means of this action need to be carefully weighed.
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Where there is enough commitment there is no stopping activists from pursuing their
struggle. The ﬂip side is that the oppression of dissent is in the interests of powerful
corporations that depend on destroying the planet, and they are supported by law
enforcement. And so a conﬂict is inevitable. Will the conﬂict result in illumination and
broader social activism? Probably only if that conﬂict has profound moral overtones –
overtones that are lost once property destruction enters the picture (Scarce 2011b).
6.1. The causes of marginalization of deep green perspective
While the ‘‘radicals’’ might be extremely disappointed with the lack of support from
the mainstream environmental organizations and anthropocentrically inclined
individuals, the most strategic political choice may still be peaceful collective
lobbying for the ecospheric interests. On the other hand, without general public’s
and governments support, and with continuing demonization of ‘‘eco-warriors’’ the
ecospheric interests are not likely to be recognized. The solution, however naı¨ve, thus
may lie in integrating deep ecology ethic in the mainstream political apparatus to
avoid both extremism and to achieve a true planetary sustainability. While the
author realizes that such integration might not be realistic in the current socio-
political climate, ignoring deep green perspective as ‘‘one of many’’ (at best) visions
is not likely to result in resolution of severe environmental issues such as biodiversity
loss.
Can anthropocentrism be said to be universal or culturally speciﬁc?
7. Cross-cultural views: view from anthropology
Anthropological literature indicates that this emotional attachment might be cross-
cultural and possibly universal (Milton 2002). There is evidence that environmental
concern is not limited to aﬄuent societies, as proponents of post-materialist values
hypothesis (Inglehart 1977) state, but is a truly universal phenomenon (Taylor 1993).
Intercultural studies indicate that despite diﬀerences in nationality and profession,
people exhibit biospheric altruism coinciding with the childhood experiences that
distinguish environmentally active respondents from those who show less commit-
ment (Wells and Lekies 2006).
There has been a proliferation of grassroots environmental organizations in
developing countries, and opinion polls demonstrate that concerns about environ-
ment are a global phenomenon (Brechin and Kempton 1994). Dunlap and York
(2008) cite international surveys which indicate that national wealth is not correlated
with environmental concerns of a global nature, challenging the claim that the poor
are too preoccupied with their material needs to support such ‘‘luxury’’ issues as
environmental protection. In the case of Africa, Lotz-Sisitka (2004) acknowledges
that mainstream sustainable development discourse espouses
anthropocentric view of environment, in which environment is viewed as ‘‘goods and
services’’ within a market-oriented framing of environment as a commodity or resource
for human consumption. African societies (and other societies) attribute other values to
environment, not only economic value (p. 1).
Anthropological evidence is mixed and shows that indigenous peoples are no more
or less ecocentric than people in ‘‘developed’’ nations (Turner 1993; Tsing 1999; Van
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Petegem and Blieck 2006). People hold a variety of values and that some people are
pro-wildlife and pro-conservation.
Inﬁeld (1988) reﬂected that though faced with problems of poverty, land shortage
and other diﬃculties directly associated with the existence of the conservation area,
respondents strongly supported the protection of wildlife. Allendorf (2007) noted
that wildlife is appreciated not only for personal enjoyment, but also because it is the
country’s wealth. On the other hand, mistrust of local communities as eﬀective
stewards of wildlife is also reﬂected in literature asserting that indigenous peoples
view animals and plants as something not worth protecting (Allendorf et al. 2006;
Inﬁeld 1988), and are capable of overuse and poor decision-making (Netting 1993).
Some anthropological evidence points to the fact that ‘‘traditional’’ societies view
wildlife from protected areas as pests (Newmark et al. 1993; Inﬁeld and Namara
2001; Allendorf et al. 2006; Trusty 2011). However, this dislike can be attributed to
global shift from traditional ecocentric values and animistic religions to neo-liberal
capitalist ‘‘values’’ imposed by industrial power holders (Milton 2002). The majority
of traits that perhaps once enabled traditional societies to live in greater harmony
with the environment than more industrialized groups are slowly diminishing
(Turner 1993). Many observers have noted that the idea of ‘‘progress’’, ‘‘modernity’’
and ‘‘development’’ is relative and that the enterprise of development actually creates
social inequalities and imbalance between humans and environment (Lewis 2005).
Western development agencies may be complacent in creating ‘‘monocultures of the
mind’’ (Shiva 1993) in which the new ‘‘holy grail’’ of the dominant political elites, the
consumerist culture, is perpetuated (Blaser et al. 2004), and culturally speciﬁc ways
of relating to each other as well as to plants and animals is undermined (Black 2010;
Eﬁrd 2011; Baines and Zarger 2012).
Considering mixed cross-cultural evidence, it appears that anthrocentrism and
ecocentrism are not necessarily culturally determined. The problem is, ethical
questions (such as why people of diﬀerent color or women should have equal
standing or why cannibalism is immoral) are not always ‘‘academic’’. Throughout
the history of philosophy, religion and ethics, there have been diﬀerent ‘‘rational
arguments’’ for preventing abuse of other beings (human or not). Thomas
Aquinas, for example, has postulated that he who kills another’s ox does indeed
commit a sin, not however, the sin of killing an ox, but rather the sin of inﬂicting
loss of property on another human’’ (Fudge 2006). Following such moral
traditions, social scientists studying human and animal encounters have rarely
seen animal death as anything other than the result of cultural practice (such as
hunting or whaling – e.g. Kalland 2009), or collateral damage (as in the case of
roadkill – e.g. Desmond 2013), or economic interest (as in the case of animal
trade – e.g. Thorne 1998), or basic necessity (as in the case of animals used for
medical testing or consumption – e.g. Shepard 1993), or symbolic ritual (as in the
case of animal sacriﬁce – e.g. Le´vi-Strauss 1968). These acts toward animals
rendered animals as culturally, socially or economically signiﬁcant objects, and
not as ‘‘victims’’.
However, these expressions of anthropocentrism are contextually variable and
culturally deﬁned. Therefore, in order to return to the question posed in the
‘‘Introduction’’ as to why radical environmentalists are among the least understood,
it might be argued that the present-day causes for this lack of understanding of deep
ecology perspective lie in anthropocentric bias which is speciﬁc to the context of
advanced industrial neo-liberal democratic society. The emotional bond between
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humans and animals has been muted by new industrial conditions in which animals
and plants are conceived in utilitarian terms (Pluhar 1995; Vining 2003).
8. Reﬂection: environmental politics and ethical expertise?
O’Riordan (1976) reﬂects that even the weaker forms of anthropocentrism such as
conservationism and human welfare ecology are not sustainable since, in the
presence of human crisis, they would be sacriﬁced for the more humanist
perspectives. Indeed, despite evidence of heightened global problems such as climate
change and biodiversity loss, ‘‘environmental considerations continue to be
subordinated to economic ones’’ (Stevenson 2006:280).
While the economic capture approach to preserving biodiversity seems to be part
of the mainstream political thinking, the latter approach calls for reﬂection on
political implications for such an approach in the rapidly globalising system of neo-
liberal democracy. The question of democratic legitimacy and conservation is hotly
debated by political observers, social scientists and the media. Some authors point to
the empirical evidence demonstrating that government policies do not need to be
legitimate in order to be eﬀective or that ecocentric approach may require diﬀerent
forms of democratic representation that would be inclusive of non-human species
(Ophuls and Boyan 1992; Oates 1999). One example demonstrating that democratic
legitimacy is not necessarily related to success of conservation policies is the creation
and maintenance of East African parks by un-democratic colonial governments, as
well as evidence of success of environmentally benign dictatorships in the Dominican
Republic (Holmes 2010) in pushing forward environmental regulation.
Richard E.F. Leakey, a paleontologist and an activist, became famous for his
ﬁght to preserve wildlife in Africa. Leaky espoused the view that the parks were self-
contained ecosystems that had to be fenced in and humans kept out. In order to
address the poaching of elephants, Leakey created special, well-armed, anti-poaching
units that were authorized to shoot poachers on sight. The poaching was
dramatically reduced (http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Richard_Le-
akey) but Leaky was widely criticized by human rights advocates.
Various authors have argued that pursuit of biodiversity conservation will fail
without addressing democratic questions of human rights to livelihoods and access
to landscapes (Western 1994; Wilshusen et al. 2002, 2003). Robyn Eckersley (2002)
has dissed how political dilemmas such as these can be framed within two alternative
approaches: ecocentric (deep green perspective approach) and environmental
pragmatism (shallow ecology), suggesting that both need to be clearly articulated
in order for dialogue between diﬀerent value holders as well as solutions to
biodiversity issues can be found.
Chawla and Cushing (2007) note that an analysis of the world’s most serious
environmental problems suggests that the eﬀect of private actions is limited unless it
is combined with organizing for public change through collective political action
(Chawla and Cushing 2007:438). At present, however, there are no empirical cases
showing wide popular support for that advocating deep ecology perspective due to
the dominance of anthropocentric power holders. Diﬀerent forms of ecologically
enlightened regimes were suggested as an alternative to deliberative democracy, such
as panels of ‘‘moral experts’’ (Hardin 1972; Heilbronner 1974; Caldwell 1990;
Foreman 1998; Terborgh 1999; Dobson 2003). Without more fully elaborated
representation of ecocentric advocates, there are no institutional guarantees that
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other species will be considered in decision-making processes, than their interests will
be constantly neglected or at least given low priority (Barry et al. 2002; Eckersley
2004, 2012).
The problem is that no existing political system, democratic or less so, seems to
actually employ a panel of ‘‘moral experts,’’ particularly the one representing the
deep ecological perspective or simply, representing the non-human entities (Lidskog
and Elander 2010). While historically the anthropocentric position of individuals
‘‘in power’’ did not threaten bio-diversity due to lower population density and non-
industrial system of production, the present-day anthropocentrism has salient
implications for the well-being and even the very survival of non-human species.
While some ‘‘green’’ political parties in Europe (such as the Party for the Animals
in The Netherlands) exercise some form of political inﬂuence over animal welfare,
such inﬂuence is proportionally very small and subordinated to other political
interests, such as social welfare and economic growth. Not only are individuals or
groups within non-human species not distinguished in terms of rights, the very
discussion of their basic right to survive is not to be found (for example,
domesticated pigs are slaughtered for human consumption and wild boars are
subject to possible extinction due to deforestation). Most green political parties are
only interested in the welfare of animals that humans consume or keep as pets and
not in ‘‘wild’’ animals outside of human instrumental interest (Vining 2003).
To sum up, and returning to the question of limitations of ‘‘economic capture’’
approach, the ‘‘moral expert’’ approach combining ethical elements provided by the
deep green perspective might be extremely useful in targeting biodiversity loss.
Multi-level environmental governance (Lidskog and Elander 2010) and deliberate
democracy (Dobson 2003) do provide room for integration of deep ecology
advocates. However, while the inclusion of such moral experts within existing
political systems is feasible, there are no guarantees that anthropocentric interests
will not dominate, as they do now. The type of ‘‘aﬃrmative action’’ by governments,
informed not just by dominant anthropocentric but ecocentric ethics might thus be
needed to assure that deep ecology is integrated in political interests.
Taking oﬀ the academic hat, the author wants to stress that the underlying ethics
supporting gender and racial equality, abolition of slavery, and other human rights
have been inconceivable a couple of generations ago. At present, treating human
minorities as less worthy will not be socially and politically acceptable in most
western liberal circles. If moral considerations underlying present-day social issues
such as racism and sexism are to be extended to other species, the (minority) voice of
human eco-centric advocates may actually represent the majority voice of all
biospheric citizens.
9. Conclusion
In this article, we have discussed the diﬀerences between anthropocentric and eco-
centric perspectives. Anthropocentrism only grants intrinsic value and, in prolonga-
tion, rights and interests to human beings. Powerful international organizations such
as the United Nations (2012) and the World Bank represent non-human species as
ecosystem services or natural resources. Conceiving biodiversity in these utilitarian
terms does not guarantee protection of those species that are not directly useful to
humanity. It was argued that mass extinction could conceivably come to pass
without jeopardizing the survival of the human species. People might be materially
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sustained by a technological biora made to yield services and products required for
human life.
In contrast to this anthropocentric paradigm, ecocentrism’s proponents assert
the intrinsic value of each individual living organism, including humans, plant and
animal species and ecosystems. Diﬀerent dimensions of biospheric altruism include
emotional (the feeling of sadness when something valued gets destroyed); cognitive
(the judgment that it is wrong to destroy this valued object); and philosophical
(intrinsic value of nature) elements.
An analysis of environmental problems suggests that the eﬀect of private actions
is limited unless it is combined with organizing for public change through collective
political action. It was proposed that the failure of the current political system to
address biodiversity loss stems from the fact that ecocentric values are under-
represented in the most powerful strata of society. While private expressions of
biophilia are acceptable, the more pronounced publicly expressed deep ecology
position is discouraged as radical.
At the onset of this article, we have inquired why ‘‘radical environmentalists’’ are
among the least understood of all contemporary opposition movements, not only in
tactical terms, but also ethically. Those human advocates that ‘‘speak for nature’’ at
international summits and inﬂuential political meetings often represent shallow
rather than deep ecology position. It was postulated that the present-day causes for
this lack of understanding are both structural (in terms of power holders such as
political and corporate elites) as well as contextually dependent (current – and thus
not ‘‘constant’’ or universal socio-cultural factors that make such anthropocentrism
acceptable). The author does see the possibility to reduce this lack of understanding
through open articulation of the ethical foundation of deep ecology perspective,
combining emotional, cognitive and philosophical underpinnings as an alternative to
the current anthropocentric paradigm.
The work of Robyn Eckersley (2002) is particularly instructive in seeing not only
why ecocentric activists have trouble ‘‘speaking the same language’’ as ‘‘environ-
mental pragmatists’’ or moderate environmentalists within the shallow ecology
movement, but also as an indication of ways forward in regard to potential of
continuing to promote such a dialogue. It is not impossible to reconcile deep and
shallow ecology visions, as ecocentric and anthropocentric positions are often
intimately interlinked (as most mainstream proponents of any form of environ-
mental protection – for human as well as for intrinsic value purposes would probably
agree on). Just as pet-owner’s commitment to their cat can be an expression of both
ecocentric (loving a non-human being) and anthropocentric (the cat is used as a
companion, fed cat food possibly originating from other slaughtered animal, etc.)
values, so can care for the environment in general be hopefully combined – when
both deep ecology and shallow ecology objectives can be clearly stated.
Note
1. The Lorax is a creation of the children’s writer Theodor Seuss Geisel (1904––1991), an
American writer and cartoonist better known by his pen name, Dr. Seuss, wrote a
children’s book about the Lorax, the prototype environmentalist ﬁghting against the
capitalist the Once-ler. The Lorax stands up for the ‘‘Traﬀula trees’’ which are being turned
into ‘‘thneeds’’ that ‘‘everybody needs’’. Addressing the Once-ler, the Lorax says:
‘‘I am the Lorax, I speak for the trees.
I speak for the trees, for the trees have no tongues. . .’’
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